OPINION – Trump’s January Foreign Policy Moves : The “Donroe” Doctrine and the Revival of Gunboat Diplomacy in Venezuela

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In the early morning of January 3rd, 2026, the US Armed Forces launched Operation Absolute Resolve. In the pitch-black darkness caused by a US-orchestrated power-outage, the Delta Force crept into downtown Caracas, Venezuela, and after a brutal gunfight with the Venezuelan presidential guards, took President Nicolas Maduro into US Custody, bringing him to the US mainland by the end of the day. In the late morning of that same day, the President Donald Trump and his closest advisors addressed the nation, declaring Maduro an obstacle to US hegemony and to the Venezuelan oil business, and that the US, in the words of the US President, would “run Venezuela.” While the situation in Venezuela has remained relatively peaceful since January 3rd, the brazen US attack falls into two broader foreign trends that the Trump administration has adopted : (1) a revival of gunboat diplomacy and (2) a more expansive revision of the heralded Monroe Doctrine. 

The Monroe Doctrine was first pronounced by President James Monroe in 1823 during his State of the Union Address. The original Monroe doctrine states that the United States shall support the independent nations of the Western Hemisphere in order to rid the region of European imperialism. The original Monroe Doctrine was successful in getting the European powers to give up many of their American holdings, which in turn allowed the US to become the hegemon power (i.e. the only great power) in the Western Hemisphere. In the 20th century, the Monroe doctrine was key to US containment strategy with regards to the Soviet Union, with the US intervening in Latin America to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. Much debate has centered around whether the Monroe Doctrine was a means of both preserving American security and promoting Latin American independence, or whether it was an instrument for US imperialism. Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom has always been that military intervention in the Western Hemisphere (to be distinguished from indirectly supporting coups in Latin America) under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine should only be in response to a real threat to American national security, such as the placement of foreign troops in an American nation. Where Trump has departed from this conventional wisdom is that he has interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to mean that the US can and should use US military force to intervene in the Americas when regimes do not fall in line with blanket US demands with regard to foreign policy, trade, or law enforcement. When the CIA backed an illegal coup against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, there were no American boots on the ground (other than covert CIA operatives). In spite of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s many faults, despite being an interventionist, he himself was reluctant to use the US military. This was a strategic

move to ensure that illegal US intervention overseas could be blamed on the forces inside each country that actually carried out the coups and subversive activities (with US backing). This would (to a certain extent) absolve the US from blowback overseas, allowed the US to maintain the illusion of a moral high ground as they were not conducting invasions (other than Vietnam which began before Kissinger’s arrival), and would prevent the US population from turning against the government for sending young Americans to die. Trump, on the other hand, has completely ditched the guardrails and is unafraid of damaging the US’s image on the international stage. While Donald Trump himself is not a foreign policy aficionado, many in his administration are and have made it clear that gunboat diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere is back. 

The foreign policy decision-makers in the second Trump administration primarily subscribe to two major currents of foreign policy : realism and neoconservatism. Realism, according to the paramount realist authors such as Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer, argues that in order for states to have the greatest change for survival in the international system, they should seek to maximize their share of world power, and more specifically try to achieve hegemony, first regionally and then globally. Realism emphasizes national interest over any other considerations, and that for countries to become more secure “insular powers,” they should dominate their continent first before other considerations. Realism is seen as the most pragmatic approach to foreign policy, not advocating for anything, including war, unless it is beneficial to increase a country’s share of world power. The adherents to America First realism in the Trump administration are those such as key advisors Stephen Miller and Alex Wong, and to a certain extent Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The neoconservative movement, on the other hand, is primarily focused on the spread of liberal democracy throughout the world by any means, whether peaceful or through war. As a conservative evolution of Wilsonianism, the Neocons seek to spread free markets and individual freedom, attempting to subvert economically illiberal regimes and authoritarians often through violence. The NeoCon contingent of the Trump administration is omnipresent, with figures such as UN Ambassador Mike Waltz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe among others. The doctrinal realists and the Neocons have often been at odds with each other in recent history, although both factions tend to lean right. The Iraq War, a clearcut Neocon war, was widely denounced by realist policymakers. The US’s military efforts to support Ukraine have largely been backed by neoconservatives but denounced by realists who deem it an unnecessary indirect intervention. 

When it comes to Trump’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, the neocons and hawkish contingent of the realists have come together under similar goals. The America First realists are proponents of US domination over the Western Hemisphere, which could be through force. The Neocons have been working for years supporting subversive activities in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba in an attempt to liberalize them. The “Donroe Doctrine” blends these two wants, exemplified perfectly by the Maduro

intervention. The Venezuelan regime was a purchaser of Chinese and Russian weaponry, and sold oil to these same powers to the displeasure of the more hawkish realists who want no foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere. The Maduro decapitation has allowed for US companies to come in and access the Venezuelan oil markets, and could potentially bring Venezuela closer to a democratic transition. The same applies to Cuba where Trump has threatened military intervention against the communist regime that, although it is more popular with its people than the Maduro regime, has been under US embargo for decades and remains in steadfast opposition to US imperialism. 

I stand in relative opposition to this attack for three reasons: (1) the Trump administration lied to the American public for the reasons for the build-up in Venezuela and did not seek congressional approval for an act that would undoubtedly constitute an 

act of war under normal circumstances, (2) if the goal is truly to enact regime change then boots would have to go on the ground which would be unpopular to the American public, (3) the intervention, as expressed by realist theorist John Mearsheimer, was not pragmatic or realist in practice; the dispute could have been resolved diplomatically as the use of force only validates unlawful military intervention by other great powers like China and Russia, and it signals to other minor powers that militarization and nuclear weapons are the ways to go unattacked. 

In the lead up to the kidnapping of Maduro, the Trump administration declared that the US was ramping up its presence in the Caribbean to address the Venezuelan drug trade which he claimed was led by their President who was the ring leader of the “Cartel de las Soles.” Yet, in the federal indictment against Maduro there is zero mention of any “Cartel de las Soles” and in Trump’s address to the nation following the attacks, any mention of drugs was secondary to talk of the need for US dominance over the Western Hemisphere and the business opportunities with regard to Venezuelan crude oil. What Trump declared was “the most transparent administration in history” had lied to the American public for months on end. But the lie was obvious from the start. Venezuela does not produce the deadly drug fentanyl as Trump initially claimed. They do not produce much of any drug. Shipments of cocaine often pass through Venezuela from Colombia en route to Europe, not the US mainland. The most egregious violation of transparency was when they launched the attack on Maduro, which would clearly constitute an act of war, without consulting Congress. Under the Constitution, the Senate must give the President approval to wage war. Even in recent conflicts where the Senate does not issue a formal declaration of war, they still issue authorizations for the use of military force, such as in Iraq. Trump’s refusal to consult Congress, in Iran during the 12 Day War and in Venezuela, represents a degradation of checks on executive power, which has been characteristic of Trump’s second term. 

The second issue I take with the intervention is that it further degrades the image of the US on the international stage and sends a dangerous message to other great powers and middle powers. To the other great powers, China and Russia, it just validates that international norms have been eroded and that military intervention in

their own regions are valid. The Russian invasion of Ukraine gains legitimacy in a world where the sole consideration in great power politics is the capability of a country to project power over its neighbors, like the US in Venezuela. This further validates potential Chinese intervention in their neighboring countries, which include US allies like Taiwan and Thailand. To the middle powers, it signals that they will never be independent and safe from US intervention unless they have nuclear weapons. Countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela have all faced the wrath of the US military when they step out of line as they are unable to respond to US aggression in any meaningful way. On the flip side, nuclear armed middle powers that oppose the US, such as North Korea, have remained safe from US intervention, and nuclear armed middle powers allied with the United States, such as Israel, have more independence in their own foreign policy than do non-nuclear US allies like Canada. Finally, to the people of the Americas, who do not want to live at the behest of the American empire, specifically in Venezuela, they are incentivized to hold contempt against the United States for impeding their independence, which could lead to blowback down the line, such as when the US invaded Iraq. The worst part of it all is that the intervention could have been resolved diplomatically. In the weeks prior to the intervention, Maduro told Trump in multiple phone calls that he would be willing to cede 50% of Venezuela’s oil fields to US oil companies, which the US wants for their heavy oil industry in Texas, in exchange for the removal of sanctions. Maduro further asserted that its alliances with China, Iran, and Russia are economic and that troops of American enemies would not be stationed in Venezuela. Still, this was not enough for Trump who seeks full control of the nation. 

My third qualm is that the Trump administration has put themselves into a position where the reality on the ground will either go mostly unchanged or lead to a drawn out US military intervention. With Maduro out of the picture, the regime remains unchanged in Venezuela. Maduro’s vice-president, Delcy Rodriguez, has stepped in as the acting president for the time being and the Bolivarian Republic (the socialist regime created by Hugo Chavez) remains. From this point there are two overarching scenarios that could emerge. The first, the US decides to simply work with the current government in place (which has made concessions to oil manufacturers) to slowly bring US companies back into Venezuela with some restrictions as US troops would not be deployed on the ground. But in this case, the intervention would be mostly in vain as Maduro had been willing to make this concession in the weeks leading up to the attack. Additionally, the process of liberalizing Venezuela with no troops deployed would be slowed since the US is not leading the charge on the ground. Finally, this first scenario would prevent Venezuela from democratizing which was one of the initial goals of the intervention (at least purportedly). In the second scenario, if the Trump administration deems that the process of working with the current regime is too slow and ineffective, they would then have to forcibly take control of Venezuela. This would not be to the US’s benefit for a number of reasons. First, it would be politically unpopular with Trump's

America First base that has widely denounced prolonged US military intervention. Second, while the Venezuelan Army would be relatively easy to defeat (according to military analysts), the real issue would be fighting guerilla warfare campaigns waged by the many Bolivarian militias in Venezuela that are loyal to the Chavez-Maduro regime, and have been heavily armed by the Bolivarian Republic. They could conduct subversive activities across the country and would be hard to put down as they are based in the mountains and jungles of Venezuela. Finally, a US invasion of Venezuela would only increase the likelihood of blowback against the US down the line. 

All in all, the Trump administration has been able to wage its intervention campaign in the Southern portion of the Western Hemisphere with little pushback. The intervention in Venezuela, was relatively popular among the neoconservative and realist 

policymakers in Congress, who equally dislike Maduro for different reasons, and even among some liberal policymakers like John Fetterman (D-Pennsylvania) who are simply content with Maduro being out of power. I envision that a US intervention in Cuba will garner similar support, especially in a country with a large population of Cubans who left following the Cuban Revolution. But where the “Donroe Doctrine” will likely fail is in garnering a popular consensus around a Greenland intervention, which has led to Trump pulling back somewhat on his bellicosity. Many of the Neocons in Congress, such as Thom Tillis (R-North Carolina) and Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) have denounced Trump’s actions as Greenland is a part of Denmark, an allied liberal democracy. Furthermore, an intervention in Greenland would risk destroying NATO which the Neocons see as a means of spreading liberal democracy across the world. 

Going forward it will be interesting to observe if the Donroe Doctrine continues to expand or is reigned in. Will Mexico, Colombia, and Greenland (all US-allied liberal democracies) have to concede to Trump’s imperialist demands and allow more active US troops on their territory? Or will more rationalist factions of the administration or Congress succeed in preventing Trump from degrading international norms and institutions?